Artifacts and Attachment: A Post-Script Philosophy of Mediation by Verbeek, Peter-Paul
Artifacts and Attachment:
A Post-Script Philosophy of Mediation
Peter-Paul Verbeek
Introduction
What should one think of things? This question is a pressing one, now that
Technology Studies has discovered artifacts as the objects of inquiry par ex-
cellence. Societies are not only held together by social relations and institu-
tions, as sociologists and anthropologists claim, but by things as well. Tech-
nology should be analysed not only in terms of the social processes in which it
is constructed, but also in terms of the role it plays in social processes itself.
Within Technology Studies, the predominant vocabulary for understand-
ing the role of artifacts in society is offered by actor-network theory. Bruno
Latour, one of its major representatives, maintains that the social sciences’
exclusive focus on humans should be abandoned. The so-called “principle of
symmetry” is the most notable feature of Latour’s approach, entailing that
humans and nonhuman entities should be studied symmetrically.No a priori
distinctions should be made between them if we are to understand what is ac-
tually happening in society. Not only humans, but also “nonhumans”, or con-
junctions of humans and nonhumans, should be understood as actors.
An important concept of actor-network theory for analysing these “thing-
ly actions” is “script”(Akrich ). This concept indicates that things-in-use
can “prescribe”specific forms of action, much like the script of a theatre play,
which orchestrates what happens on stage. A plastic coffee cup, for instance,
has the script “throw me away after use”; the cameras along many roads in the
Netherlands have the script “don’t drive faster than  km/h”.Artifacts are not
passive and inert entities. They actively co-shape what actors do.
The actor-network vocabulary for understanding this active role of arti-
facts in society has proven to be very fertile. Yet, it could benefit from several
additions. This becomes clear when it is translated into the context of indus-
trial design. Within that discipline, a discussion is currently waging on eco-
design, which aims at finding criteria for designing sustainable products. In
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this discussion, the Dutch industrial designers association “Eternally Yours”
takes an unorthodox stance.
In contrast to the common strategy of trying to reduce pollution in the
production, consumption, and waste stages of a product’s life cycle, Eternally
Yours is looking for ways to enhance product longevity. The primary envi-
ronmental problem concerning consumer products is, Eternally Yours main-
tains, that most products are thrown away long before they are actually worn
out. Designing clean products does not sufficiently address this problem.
Products that are truly environmentally friendly should also create some
kind of attachment between their users and themselves, so that they can be
cherished throughout their lifespan instead of being thrown away prema-
turely.
Attempts to enhance the attachment between people and products require
an understanding of this attachment, especially with regard to the way in
which products themselves can stimulate its generation.The work of Eternal-
ly Yours thus raises the question of how the relationships between humans
and artifacts can be understood. It will appear that Latour’s vocabulary is
helpful in answering this question, but that it needs to be augmented in order
to do full justice to the role of things in people’s everyday lives. I shall develop
this augmentation by reinterpreting phenomenology, and by elaborating it
literally into a post-script philosophy of technical mediation.
Eternally Yours
The major aim of the Dutch industrial-designer association “Eternally
Yours” is to develop innovative ideas for “sustainable design” (Van Hinte
). It considers the current dominant approach within eco-design –
which focusses on life cycle analysis () – too superficial to be genuinely ef-
fective. Life cycle analyses anticipate the pollution caused by products in the
different stages of their life cycles: production, consumption, and waste. 
may make it possible to design products that are friendlier to the environ-
ment, but according to Eternally Yours, it overlooks the most fundamental
problem: the short lifespan of consumer goods. In our throwaway culture,
many products are discarded while they remain entirely capable of carrying
out their function. Making products less polluting, therefore, is not enough.
Environmental pressure will remain unabatedly high as long as all those
“clean” products keep being thrown away and replaced as rapidly as is cur-
rently the case.
Eternally Yours’ worries are not restricted to obvious throwaway products
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like disposable teaspoons and cups. Research for the Dutch Ministry of Envi-
ronmental Affairs has shown that a large proportion of our everyday user ob-
jects, like hi-fi equipment, stoves, razors, and computers, is discarded al-
though the objects still function well (Eternally Yours , ). Even worse,
some products do not even reach the market. Brand new harddisks are de-
stroyed regularly by recycling companies because they have already become
outdated before they were even sold.
The environmental crisis, according to Eternally Yours, is not only a tech-
nological problem, but a cultural one as well. The interesting thing about
Eternally Yours is that it does not try to evoke the cultural change it considers
necessary by creating awareness, but by rearranging material culture. It looks
for ways to stimulate longevity. Eternally Yours discerns three dimensions in
the lifespan of products: a technical, an economical, and a psychological di-
mension. Products can turn into waste because they are simply broken and
can no longer be repaired, because they are replaced by newer models, or be-
cause they no longer fit people’s preferences and tastes. Of these, Eternally
Yours regards the psychological lifespan as the most important (Muis et al.
). Many products are discarded because their psychological time is up. In
order to create longevity, therefore, Eternally Yours seeks to design things that
invite people to use and cherish them as long as possible. “It’s time for a new
generation of products that can age slowly and in a dignified way, become our
partners in life and support our memories,” as the Italian designer Ezio
Manzini put it on Eternally Yours’ letter head.
The crucial question for sustainable design is therefore: how can the psy-
chological lifespan of products be prolonged? How can things stimulate the
forging of a bond between their users and themselves? In three subprograms,
Eternally Yours develops ideas to find answers to this question. In the pro-
gram “Shape ‘n Surface”, it searches for forms and materials that could create
longevity. Materials are being tested that do not become less attractive
through aging but have “quality of wear”. Leather, for instance, is generally
found more beautiful when it has been used for some time, whereas a shiny
polished chrome surface looks worn out with the first scratch. A good exam-
ple of a design within this program is the upholstery of a couch that was de-
signed by Sigrid Smits. An initially invisible pattern is stitched into the velvet
that is used for it.When the couch has been used for a while, the pattern grad-
ually becomes visible (Muis et al. ). Instead of aging in an unattractive
way, this couch renews itself as it ages.
The second Eternally Yours subprogram called “Sales ‘n Services” pays at-
tention to the ways in which the services around products can influence their
lifespan. The availability of repair and upgrading services can prevent people
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from discarding products prematurely. Companies can shift their core activi-
ties from continuously producing and selling new products to maintaining
sustainable relations with customers.
The third subprogram,“Signs ‘n Scripts”, investigates the role of the semi-
otic and symbolic aspects (“signs”) of things in their lifespan, and their im-
plicit prescriptions about how to use them (“scripts”). Stories around prod-
ucts, for instance, can give them more “character”, like a Nikon advertisement
some time ago, showing a camera that had been lying on the bottom of the
ocean for ten years but still worked. This camera is not portrayed as the latest
model with the newest features, but as a reliable product the owner can be
proud of. The bond between people and products can also be influenced by
scripts: things can create attachment by demanding that they be dealt with in
a certain way. This aspect of products will be elaborated later in this chapter.
To elaborate these programs, Eternally Yours needs a vision of products
that goes beyond the standard approaches within industrial design. Products
are commonly approached in terms of their functionality on the one hand,
and their style and meaning on the other. They are designed to work and, as a
semiotic surplus to their functionality, to embody a style that fits their in-
tended owners. In our postmodern consumption society, products should
not only work, but also be expressions of lifestyles. For example, Braun man-
ager Godehard Günther says in a textbook for industrial designers: “We do
not sell devices, but a way of living”. The French suitcase company Louis Vuit-
ton adds: “Of course we produce top solid travel equipment, but we also sell
myths and dreams, a certain way of travelling. Luxury, independence, and a
feeling of flexibility are what characterise the owner of a Vuitton suitcase”
(Bürdek ,  – my translation).
To Eternally Yours, however, functional and semiotic approaches to things
do not suffice. If products were only designed from the perspective of their
functions, people’s attachment would not concern the products themselves,
but only what the products do for them. People would not care whether it is
this specific product they are dealing with or not. In Albert Borgmann’s
terms, it would be at best the commodity delivered by a product that would
matter, not the product itself, i.e., the machinery that does all the work
(Borgmann ).Conversely, if things were only present as signs for lifestyles
and identities, people could only get attached to these signs, not to the things
that carry them. If products are to invite us to get attached to them, therefore,
they should not be present to people as mere carriers of functionality and
meaning, but also as material entities. The attachment they enable should not
only concern their functions or meanings, but the products themselves.
Thus from a practical point of view, Eternally Yours stumbled upon the
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importance of the materiality of things. But how should this materiality be
conceptualised? How can one do justice to it when thinking about things –
without recurring to a naturalistic or naive realist position which pretends to
be able to get in touch with “things themselves”? 
Conceptualising materiality
Latour’s theory of technical mediation offers a way to do justice to this mate-
riality of things. I shall limit myself here to the way he developed his position
in the articles Where Are the Missing Masses? – the sociology of a few mundane
artifacts () and On Technical Mediation (), which re-appeared in a
slightly adapted form in Pandora’s Hope (a) as “A Collective of Humans
and Nonhumans”. As pointed out in the introduction, Latour proposes treat-
ing people and things (“humans”and “nonhumans”) symmetrically. Actions
are usually performed by compositions of humans and nonhumans. If I cycle
to the university where I work, my travelling is performed jointly by my bicy-
cle and I. There is neither any biking without me, nor without my bicycle. The
nonhuman parts of such compositions should not be understood as passive
and neutral instruments.They actively co-shape the action that is performed,
that is, they co-act. Without a bicycle, my travel would be entirely different,
and so would my contact with my surroundings.
Latour’s principle of symmetry is of great importance to developing a
more material way of thinking about things. Not only does it show that things
have a capacity to act, but also that they have this capacity by virtue of their
materiality: their concrete “thingly” presence. The way my bicycle mediates
my contact with the landscape is not part of its functionality or style. The spe-
cific way in which the bicycle, as a physical object, enables me to go to work
organises my relation with the environment in a specific way. This “surplus”
of what things do besides function can be described as mediation.
To Latour,mediation primarily concerns action.However,he is no classical
actiontheorist. In his approach, “action” does not indicate the conscious ac-
tivities of intentional subjects, but simply all that is “happening”, which,
therefore, leaves traces on reality. Mediating action is co-shaping what is hap-
pening. Artifacts can play such a mediating role, for instance, by demanding
that they be dealt with in a certain way. To mention some of Latour’s exam-
ples, speed bumps mediate people’s driving behaviour by encouraging them
to drive slowly. Door springs mediate the speed with which people can enter a
building, by giving them only a certain amount of time to enter. Heavy
weights attached to hotel keys mediate whether or not people return those
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keys to the reception desk, because they are usually too cumbersome to carry
around for a long time. The mediation of action, according to Latour, has the
form of “prescriptions”that can be expressed in language as a “script”, a series
of instructions on how to act. The speed bump mentioned, for instance, has
the script “slow down when you approach me”; a plastic coffee cup says
“throw me away after use”, as was cited in the introduction. Things mediate
action here as material things, not only as carriers of signs or functions. A
traffic sign makes people slow down in quite a different way – if it does so at all
– and the function of a coffee cup does not include of making people throw it
away.
In On Technical Mediation Latour develops four concepts to help under-
stand the mediating role of artifacts. He discerns translation as the first mean-
ing of “mediation”. When artifacts mediate, they translate what Latour calls
“programs of action”. If someone is angry with somebody else, he or she
might have the program of action “take revenge”. If the anger is very strong,
and there happens to be a gun around, this program of action could be trans-
lated into “shoot that person”. The program of action is then translated into a
new one, and along with this, both the angry person and the gun have
changed as the person becomes a potential killer and the gun, a potential
murder weapon instead of being just a deterrent object lying about. In this
translation, both human and nonhuman aspects play a role. The human in-
tention to express anger and the nonhuman function of the gun to shoot a
bullet merge into the hybrid of “a person with a gun”, which can only be un-
derstood by taking both its human and its nonhuman aspects into account.
This emergence of hybrids can be indicated by the second term from La-
tour’s vocabulary of mediation: composition. Mediation consists of enabling
the generation of new programs of action on the basis of the newly develop-
ing relations between the actants in question. This implies that the new pro-
gram of action is owned by a “composite actant”, and that responsibility for
the resulting action should be spread among all actants involved. “Action is
simply not a property of humans but of an association of actants” (Latour
, ).
Mediation thus consists of mixing humans and nonhumans. This mixing
work usually remains hidden, however. Most of the time it is “black-boxed”:
the composite actant is taken for granted,making the “joint production of ac-
tors and artifacts entirely opaque”(Latour ,).This reversible black-box-
ing is the third meaning of “mediation”. To return to a previous example, all
the work that has been done to design and produce a bicycle remains con-
cealed. But when the chain runs from the sprocket, suddenly all kinds of enti-
ties “materialise” around the bike, as Latour would phrase it: a sprocket and a
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chain, which were not explicitly observed when biking, a repair person, the
tools needed to repair the bike.All these entities are required to make the bike
work as they are mixed together into the hybrid we call a bicycle. They there-
fore mediate my relation with my bike, and make it possible for me to have a
bicycle that mediates my going to work,and especially, the way in which“I”do
that.
The fourth and last term in Latour’s vocabulary of mediation is delegation.
Latour calls this the “most important meaning of mediation” (Latour ,
). The concept of delegation indicates that programs of action can be “in-
scribed” into artifacts. The speed bump is a good example of this, according
to Latour. If local authorities want people to drive slower in certain areas, they
can do several things. They can put traffic signs along the road with an indica-
tion of the maximum speed allowed, put a policeman near the signs, or install
a piece of concrete that is charged with the task of ensuring that people do not
drive too fast. The program of action “make drivers slow down” is thus in-
scribed into a piece of concrete, which now becomes a “speed bump”with the
script “drive slowly or damage your shock absorbers”. Such delegations, ac-
cording to Latour,enable a remarkable combination of presence and absence.
The past action of an absent actor – the designer of the speed bump, or the
mayor who insisted that the bump be placed – exerts influence on people’s
behaviour here and now.
These four aspects of mediation are closely connected. With regard to the
speed bump, the authorities allied themselves to a piece of concrete (compo-
sition) and conveyed all that is needed for the realisation of their goal to the
speed bump (delegation); after this, the bump can handle things by itself
(black-boxing), because it changes the program of action of drivers from
“driving slowly because of responsibility”into “driving slowly in order to save
my shock absorbers” (translation). Translation, composition, reversible
black-boxing,and delegation each form an aspect of technical mediation that
could not exist without the others.
Delegation and symmetry
Latour’s approach to things can be helpful to the Eternally Yours program. He
shows that products have “scripts”: they mediate action. Artifacts influence
the way in which people do things,and this influence could be deliberately in-
scribed into them. To Eternally Yours, the most interesting scripts are those
that evoke attachment between products and user which therefore stimulates
people to throw away products less quickly. Sustainable products should in-
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vite people to develop a durable relationship with them. When trying to
imagine what inscriptions that promote this kind of attachment might look
like, however, it becomes clear that Latour’s theory of mediation could bene-
fit from some refinement and addition.
People can only develop a durable relationship with artifacts if what mat-
ters is not just a matter of style or function.After all, other artifacts could em-
body the same meaningfulness or functionality, but no other artifact can be
this specific material thing, here and now. If someone is only attached to the
style of a product, this product could as well be replaced by another one with
the same sign value or the same iconography for the lifestyle this person wish-
es to be associated with. If it is only the function of a product that matters,
then it could just as easily be replaced by an artifact functioning equally well
or even better. In order to create attachment between people and products,
products should be present and applicable in terms of their materiality, and
not only their functionality or meaningfulness.
In order to be present to people in a material way, products could be de-
signed to engage users explicitly in their function – including their durability,
repair, and upgrading. If people need to interact with a product, their atten-
tion is not only directed at what it accomplishes or expresses, but also at the
product itself. Many of Eternally Yours’ solutions actually work this way: they
engage people with their materiality. The stitched velvet mentioned above in-
volves people in the wearing process. Upgradable and repairable products
make people part of their aging and maintenance processes.
When trying to conceptualise how such “engaging products” can be pres-
ent for people, however, it appears that it is not so much delegations from hu-
mans to things that are relevant here, but delegations from things to humans.
If people are to be involved in the functioning of products, these products
should delegate specific tasks and responsibilities to people. Delegations of
this kind are underexposed in Latour’s analysis of technical mediation. In his
examples, Latour focusses on delegations from humans to nonhumans. The
speed bump, key weight, and door-spring aforementioned do what they do
because people told them so; in other words, officials have bumps installed
because they want people to drive slowly; housekeepers install door-springs
to prevent draughts; hotel owners attach weights to their keys to stimulate
guests to return them to reception when leaving the hotel.
This one-sided focus raises the suspicion of asymmetry. This suspicion is
reinforced by Latour’s use of the concept of “inscription”. Scripts are sup-
posed to be the products of “inscribing”, i.e., they are reducible to human ac-
tivities. The same line of thought can be found with Akrich, when she first in-
troduced the “script” concept: “Designers thus define actors with specific
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tastes, competencies, motives, aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest
(…) A large part of the work of innovators is that of ‘inscribing’ this vision of
(…) the world in the technical content of the new object. I will call the end
product of this work a ‘script’ or a ‘scenario’” (, ; her emphasis). Both
Latour and Akrich see scripts as the result of “inscriptions” – and inscription
is an asymmetrical concept, since only humans have the ability to inscribe.
There is no real asymmetry involved here, however. Implicitly, Latour does
discuss delegations vice versa: from nonhumans to humans. In Where Are the
Missing Masses?, for instance, he expresses his admiration for a hydraulic
door closer, because it easily absorbs the energy of those who open the door,
retains it, and then gives it back slowly “with a subtle type of implacable firm-
ness that one could expect from a well-trained butler”(Latour , ). This
door-closer delegates to people the delivery of the energy it needs to close the
door after it has been opened. Openness to delegation of this kind is crucial
because, otherwise, only those forms of mediation that are explicitly intend-
ed by humans can be perceived, whereas things often do more than that.A re-
volving door has been delegated the task of keeping out draughts, while still
maintaining the possibility of entering a building. That it also keeps out peo-
ple in a wheelchair was nobody’s explicit intention. Nor did the designers of
the hydraulic door-closer intend them to discriminate against children and
elderly people who are not strong enough to open them (Latour , ).
Yet, Latour’s focus on delegation and inscription remains remarkable. If
we are to understand the ways in which artifacts mediate, it does not matter
all that much how they came to do so.What is important is that they play me-
diating roles, and the most relevant question to an analysis of technical medi-
ation is how they do this. Focussing on the generation of the mediating roles
of things could be seen as a relic from the early days in ,when the ambition
was to show that “facts”or “technologies”are actually contingent outcomes of
processes of construction in which many actants interact. This deconstruc-
tionist approach aimed to unravel how entities come to be what they are. An
analysis of the mediating role of artifacts can take the constructedness of this
role for granted, however. For the understanding of technical mediation, the
inscription processes and delegations from humans to nonhumans may re-
main black-boxed. Only the mediating role itself is relevant here, not its ori-
gins.
In their research into drug users and amateur musicians, Emilie Gomart
and Antoine Hennion also observe the limitations of understanding media-
tion in terms of “inscriptions” and “delegations”. In their view, concepts like
these “render” objects “as prolongations of actions already initiated else-
where; moreover, these object-mediators do not just repeat and relay actions
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but also transform these in surprising ways” (Gomart and Hennion ,
). Their solution is to replace the concept of “action” with that of “events”.
The attachment between people and drugs or music cannot be adequately
understood in terms of “action”: the experiences of drug users and amateur
musicians are events which “cannot be reduced to an interaction of causal ob-
jects and intentional persons” (Gomart and Hennion , ). The role of
the “things” involved in these events (the drugs and records) should not be
understood in terms of what has been delegated to them. Rather, they are “the
locus of an event”, as Gomart and Hennion phrase it: “There, in that en-
counter, the user is seized at those very points of asperity (or affordance) that
are made possible and relevant by the sophistication of his/her own practices
and vocabularies, as well as by the properties of the objects used” (Gomart
and Hennion , ).
Although Eternally Yours needs somewhat different forms of attachment
than that of drug users and music amateurs, Gomart and Hennion are right
when they say that mediating artifacts should be approached as entities
around which events occur, not as the outcomes of processes of interaction.
This change of perspective creates the space necessary to see how artifacts ac-
tively co-shape the events around them, and to understand these events not
only in terms of action but in terms of experiences as well. Delegations from
things to people, not from people to things, form one way in which artifacts
mediate what happens around them – a way that is particularly important to
Eternally Yours. The attachment between users and industrial products that
can come about in this mediation is less intense than that of drug users and
amateur musicians. Where the latter are “seized”by the artifacts that mediate
their experiences, the former are “engaged”by products that delegate tasks to
them. Nonetheless, the structure of both attachments is the same. Just as the
experience of drugs and music is always a blend of activity and passivity,
striving and being seized – the users of engaging products both actively use
the artifact and are used by it.
In order to be really helpful to Eternally Yours, this “expansion” of 
needs to be carried a bit further. Not only the structure of attachment should
be analysed, as was done by Gomart and Hennion, but also the role artifacts
play in the realisation of this attachment. An analysis of this role should go
beyond the concept of “script” if we are serious about replacing “action” with
“events” in our analysis. The “script” concept remains biased toward action:
scripts are defined as sets of “prescriptions” on how to act (Latour , -
).And,more importantly, it erroneously suggests that mediation is a prop-
erty of the artifacts themselves, not of the relationship between humans and
artifacts. Artifacts are supposed to “have” scripts where the mediating forces
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that co-shape the events around artifacts are localised in the artifacts them-
selves. After all, if this were not the case, it would not make sense to speak of
delegations “to”nonhumans and inscriptions “in”artifacts.
An alternative interpretation of technical mediation can be developed,
however, that does not localise mediation in the mediating artifacts them-
selves, but in the relationship between people and artifacts, or better such as in
the “artifactually” mediated relation between humans and their environ-
ment. In order to understand the “encounter”between humans and objects –
as Gomart and Hennion call it – in a more detailed way than  does, a rein-
terpretation of phenomenology offers a suitable framework. In this reinter-
pretation, classical phenomenology is freed from the essentialist and roman-
tic connotations that have become connected to it over the past century.
Within the resulting “postphenomenological” perspective – to use a term of
Don Ihde in a somewhat different way than he does himself – phenomenolo-
gy is understood as analysing the relationships between humans and their
world. Technical mediation should be localised precisely in these relation-
ships.
A postphenomenology of attachment
Postphenomenology and actor-network theory
During the first half of the th century, phenomenology was an influential
philosophical movement. However, its influence has steadily waned over the
past few decades. Phenomenology aroused the suspicion of being a romantic
and essentialist approach.It was increasingly at odds with the rising contextu-
alism in philosophy, brought about by the emphasis on both linguistics and
postmodernism.Nevertheless, it is possible to formulate a phenomenological
perspective that leaves these problematic connotations behind. This “post-
phenomenological”perspective appears to complement  in several ways.
Like actor-network theory, phenomenology developed in opposition to
the realism and positivism of the sciences. Seen from a present-day perspec-
tive, however, it ultimately did this in a highly problematic way. Against the
claim of the sciences that they would reveal reality as it “truly” is, phenome-
nologists like Merleau-Ponty stated that scientifically interpreted reality was
actually a derivative from a more fundamental one – that of the reality of
everyday experience. Only on the basis of experiencing the meaningful,
everyday world, Merleau Ponty claimed, can the sciences build their abstrac-
tions. In opposition to the sciences, therefore, he saw phenomenology as a
method for “describing”the world, not “analysing”it.
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Classical phenomenology – at least some positions within it – thus tried to
counter the sciences with an alternative claim. Not science but phenomenol-
ogy itself would be able to get into contact with “reality itself”. This “phenom-
enological realism” has become problematic in the light of the currently
dominant view that the relationship between humans and reality is always
mediated and contextual. The romantic search for “authentic”access to reali-
ty, in order to overcome the alienation brought about by science, ultimately
got phenomenology into trouble.
However, phenomenology does not need to be just as a philosophy of
alienation. Classical phenomenologists saw it as their ultimate goal to “de-
scribe the world” (Merleau-Ponty) or to understand the “intuition of
essences” (Husserl) or the “self-manifestation of being” (Heidegger), but in
their attempts to reach these goals, they accomplished something else as well.
In order to understand these “essences”, “world”, and “being”, they all devel-
oped analyses of the relationships between humans and reality. Husserl
analysed this relationship in terms of consciousness, Merleau-Ponty in terms
of perception, Heidegger in terms of being-in-the-world. It would be more
modest and less problematic, therefore, to understand phenomenology as
analysing the relationships between humans and their world. In this way, the
pretension to possess the key to authentic contact with reality is relinquished.
Common to all classical phenomenological analyses of human-world rela-
tionships is that they contain a variant of Husserl’s concept of “intentionali-
ty”. To Husserl, this concept made it possible to navigate between the cliffs of
realism (the idea that the world can be known as it is “in itself”) on the one
hand, and idealism (the idea that the world we know is a product of our con-
sciousness) on the other. Husserl claimed that subjects and objects cannot be
separated in this rigid way, but are instead always interrelated. The concept of
“intentionality” indicates that humans are continually directed towards their
world. People cannot help but be involved with their world as they are always
experiencing it, and it is the only place where they can live their lives. In every-
day life, subject and object are never separated, as realism and idealism sug-
gest, but are always already interrelated.
Radically interpreted, this concept of intentionality is able to avoid the pit-
falls of romanticism and essentialism mentioned above. Subject and object
should not be seen as simply “related to each other”; they constitute each other
in their interrelation. In their mutual relationship, they co-shape one anoth-
er. In each situation, humans are what they are on the basis of their relation to
their world, and their world is what it is on the basis of their relation to it. In
their involvement with reality,humans necessarily disclose it in a specific way,
and are themselves constituted in specific ways. In the interrelation of hu-
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mans and world, therefore, a specific “objectivity” of a world and a specific
“subjectivity” of humans are generated. It should be mentioned that none of
the two poles may be made absolute here. People cannot arbitrarily disclose
any world, since there is always “something”that is disclosed as a world. Con-
versely, the fact that humans are what they are on the basis of their relation to
the world does not imply that they are entirely determined by it.
As later phenomenology did – including the later Husserl himself – this
view of phenomenology replaces Husserl’s transcendental subject by an exis-
tential subject, and does not conceive the world as a collection of “objects”,
but as a lifeworld. The world is the place where humans realise their existence,
and which is continually experienced and interpreted by them. What sets my
reinterpretation of phenomenology apart from classical phenomenology,
however, is the centrality of the notion of mutual constitution and, as will be-
come clear below, the notion of the mediated character of this constitution.
Husserl, too, used the concept of “constitution”in his work, but he localised it
exclusively on the subjective side: he tried to understand how subjects consti-
tute a world. As opposed to this, I localise constitution in the interrelation of
subjects and objects. Not only objects but subjects are also constituted in the
intentionality relationship that exists between them.
The phenomenological perspective I defend here has the same symmetri-
cal intentions as are present in Latour’s work in that it tries to overcome the
“Grand Canyon”between subject and object by showing that both cannot ex-
ist separately. It even goes one step further, by stating that subject and object
constitute each other. The resulting “postphenomenological” perspective
overcomes the dangers of classical phenomenology by working out the classi-
cal aversion to context-independent truths and radical subject-object dis-
tinction in a new way. It considers the “postmodern” reduction of reality to
language games, contexts, or other deconstructionist elements to be inade-
quate as well, since these only confirm the subject-object distinction by
stressing the subjective side. Postphenomenology holds that realities come
about in relations, as well as the humans that are related to these realities. Like
actor-network theory, phenomenology stresses the contingency of reality,
and the need for a “relational ontology”where reality is only given in the rela-
tions humans have with it.
The main difference between postphenomenology and actor-network
theory is that postphenomenology is primarily interested in the relationships
between people and the world, instead of the “constructions”that arise in and
through them. To , these relationships consist of networks of humans
and nonhumans within which reality is constructed; to postphenomenology,
they consist of the intentional relationships between humans and their
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world, in which both “objectivity” and “subjectivity” are constituted. Post-
phenomenology does not bridge the “Grand Canyon” between subject and
object by blurring the distinction between them – as  does, claiming that
they are to be treated as semiotically equivalent entities – but by showing that
they are intertwined, even at the level of their constitution. Postphenomenol-
ogy aims to understand the “contact”between humans and world: the experi-
ences and actions in which they co-shape each other.
Seen from the perspective of , postphenomenology might appear to
be a very limited approach, since it only studies very short networks.After all,
the human-world relationships it analyses involve only two actants: a per-
ceiving or acting human and an actant (human or nonhuman), which is ex-
perienced or interacted with.At best, three actants are involved: when techni-
cal mediation occurs, a third, nonhuman actant is added to the network.
When humans are indicated by an “” and nonhumans by “”, a postphe-
nomenological perspective on mediation only analyses the networks --
 and --. But this simplicity is no shortcoming. The fact is that actor-
network theorists could treat each of the three elements of the human-tech-
nology-world network as a black box, containing networks of any desired
complexity. Postphenomenology does not deconstruct these entities, simply
because it asks a different question than  does. It is not primarily interest-
ed in the networks behind entities, but in the relationships humans can have
with them – whether they are constructed or not. Postphenomenology stud-
ies these relationships in a more detailed way than  investigates the net-
worked connections between actants.Where Latour simply speaks of “associ-
ations”, postphenomenology studies these associations in a differentiated
way. Human-world relationships comprise action and experience, and medi-
ating artifacts can be present in several ways in this relationship, as will be-
come clear below.
Technological intentionality
The postphenomenological point of view offers new possibilities for under-
standing mediation by artifacts. It suggests that mediation takes place in hu-
man-world relationships: when artifacts are used, they enable and co-shape
relationships between humans and their environment. This implies that arti-
facts do more than mediate action. Action is only one aspect of the relation-
ship between humans and their world, an aspect that becomes visible when
approaching this relationship “from the human side”, since action can be seen
as the way humans can be present in their world. However, the human-world
relationship can be approached from the opposite direction as well. Seen
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“from the world side”, it concerns the ways in which reality can be present for
people. This counterpart to “action”is “experience”. The contact between hu-
mans and the world, therefore, has two modi: action and experience, aggre-
gating into “ways of existing” (existentially) on the one hand, and “forms of
interpretation”(hermeneutically) on the other.
The distinction between action and experience allows an expansion of La-
tour’s analysis of technical mediation. When an artifact is used, it co-shapes
human-world relations by giving shape not only to people’s actions but also
to people’s experiences. When using a car, for instance, the car mediates the
relationship between a person and his or her world. It lets this person be pres-
ent as a driver, who’s able to move quickly from one place to another. This
contributes to the generation of specific forms of existence. A car, for in-
stance, allows people to choose a place to live that is far from work, and main-
tain social relationships outside their immediate living environment. At the
same time, it lets the environment through which he or she drives be present
in a specific way. From a car, one cannot smell or hear the environment, in-
stead one receives intense and rapidly changing visual impressions. When I
take the bicycle to work, my commuting has a completely different character
than when I take the car or walk, as does my relation to the meadows, the
cows, and the people I pass.A car not only mediates people’s actions but their
experiences as well. It co-shapes the ways in which humans can be present in
their world and the ways in which reality can be present to humans.
This expanded understanding of mediation invites an expansion of the
concept of “script” as well. Within Latour’s analysis, scripts are primarily re-
lated to action. Scripts concern the translation, inscription, and delegation of
programs of action, whereas a concept is needed that indicates mediation in
the broadest sense, a mediation of the interrelationship between humans and
their world. Don Ihde’s concept of “technological intentionality” could serve
this purpose, in a slightly adapted way.
With “technological intentionality”, Ihde indicates that technologies have
“intentions” – they actively shape people’s relations with their world. A pen,
for instance, asks for a completely different writing style than a typewriter
and a word processor do. With a pen, people tend to write longer, carefully
formulated sentences, whereas a typewriter invites a more speech-like style of
writing (Ihde , -). As Latour does with “scripts”, Ihde implicitly lo-
calises this technological intentionality in the things themselves.From a post-
phenomenological perspective, however, it is more adequate to localise tech-
nological intentionality in the relationship between humans and their world.
Within classical phenomenology, this relationship has been called “inten-
tionality”, as the above section showed.What Ihde in fact brings to light is that
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technologies can create a “technologically mediated” intentionality, a rela-
tionship between humans and a world in which their mutual constitution is
mediated by technological artifacts. When technologies are used, they co-
shape human-world relationships: they make possible practices and experi-
ences, and in so doing, they play an active role in the way humans can be pres-
ent in their world and vice versa. I would like to define “technological inten-
tionality”, therefore, as an abbreviation of “technologically mediated inten-
tionality”.
This definition of technological intentionality implies that the mediating
capacity of artifacts is no essential property of things themselves, but emerges
from the interplay of things and their context. Technologies are “multistable”,
as Ihde observes, in that they are what they are only within the context in
which they are used (Ihde , -). What things are, and therefore how
they mediate the mutual constitution of people and the world, emerges from
people’s relationships with them. Mediating things have to be constituted
themselves before they can mediate the mutual constitution of people and
the world, to phrase it in the vocabulary of classical phenomenology. A re-
volving door can constitute a building as inaccessible for persons in a wheel-
chair,and as draught-free for people who are able to enter it. In the first case, it
constitutes its user as disabled, in the latter as mobile enough to pass through.
The mediating role of the door depends on the kind of relationship someone
has with it. Its “stability”, and therefore its mediating role,“emerges” from the
interplay between the door and its users.
Since technological intentionalities, unlike scripts, are not properties of
artifacts themselves, but technologically mediated relationships via artifacts,
it is not possible here to reduce artifacts to what was delegated to them by
people. Nobody delegated to a revolving door that it should prevent people in
wheelchairs from entering the building. Within a postphenomenological
perspective, the reduction of nonhumans to humans or the other way round
is simply not an option. Humans and the world are distinct and irreducible to
each other, but they are nevertheless also inextricably intertwined and co-
shape each other. Postphenomenology, in other words, does not abolish the
distinction between humans and nonhumans, but shows their fundamental
connectedness and interrelatedness. Artifacts mediate ways of existence
(subjectivities) and experienced realities (objectivities) not because people
told them to do so,but because of the relation between humans and the world
that comes about through them.
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Engaging mediators
The postphenomenological perspective on mediation allows for an approach
to artifacts in which their mediating role is not reduced to what humans dele-
gate to them. Localising the mediating role of artifacts in the interplay be-
tween humans and the world grants things the degree of independence they
deserve. Although they do not autonomously shape human-world relations,
their role cannot be entirely reduced to “non-thingly”factors.
The postphenomenological perspective on mediation, therefore, does jus-
tice to the materiality of things, and this might make it useful to Eternally
Yours. What Eternally Yours needs, after all, is an approach to things that, in
contrast to the predominant focus on functionality and meaningfulness
within industrial design, focusses on the relationships between people and
things themselves.
Earlier in this chapter, it became clear that in order to be “eternally ours”,
things should evoke engagement with themselves as material entities. To ac-
complish this, it was said, products could be designed in such a way that they
engage people in their functioning. A postphenomenological perspective on
human-artifact relationships can shed more light on this engagement, and
therefore it might be helpful when looking for ways to stimulate it. In order to
understand situations in which things involve people in their functioning –
situations that in a Latourian vocabulary could be called “delegations from
nonhumans to humans” – another (but short) expansion of the theory of
technical mediation has to be made. In order to understand engagement with
products, it is not only necessary to understand how artifacts mediate hu-
man-world relationships, but also how they are present for people when they
do so.
Things mediate human-world relationships when they are used, and
things-in-use are present in a peculiar way: they are present and absent si-
multaneously.When a technology is used, people’s attention is not directed at
the technology itself, but at what they can do or experience by means of it. If
this were different, after all, it would not be possible to use things. Technolo-
gies only draw attention to themselves when they break down. When ham-
mering a nail into the wall, people’s attention is not directed at the hammer,
but at the nail; only when the head comes loose from the handle does the
hammer ask for attention. Heidegger called these two modes of human-arti-
fact relations “readiness-to-hand” (zuhandenheit – artifacts-in-use) and
“presence-at-hand” (vorhandenheit – artifacts asking attention for them-
selves).
The distinction between being “ready to hand” and “present at hand” can
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be a starting point for understanding the relationship between humans and
“engaging objects”. The fact is that engaging objects merge these two modes
of thingly presence in a specific way. From the perspective of Heidegger’s dis-
tinction, the concept of “engaging technologies” might seem paradoxical at
first sight. After all, how can a technology withdraw and at the same time ask
for involvement and engagement with itself? From what has been stated
above, it seems to follow that technologies that ask for involvement with
themselves cannot be used at all because people’s attention can only be direct-
ed at the object itself, not at what could be done by means of it. But, engaging
technologies do exist.Artifacts that can ask for involvement do not necessari-
ly have to be entirely present-at-hand.
Compare, for instance, a piano with a  player. A  player in use is
ready-to-hand in that it withdraws from people’s attention and becomes
transparent in order to give access to the music it plays. A broken  player is
present-at-hand in that it is not transparent but opaque, because it blocks
people’s access to the music it could play if it worked. The way in which a pi-
ano is present combines these two modi of presence. It is ready-to-hand, but
still engages people in its functioning. If it were not ready-to-hand, it could
not give access to the music that can be played on it. Only when someone is
learning to play is the piano present-at-hand, and the piano player’s attention
is only directed toward the piano itself. After this learning stage, the piano
player becomes engaged with the music he or she plays on the piano. The pi-
ano never completely withdraws, however. In order to be played, it asks for a
lot of involvement as a physical entity. Whereas a  player only asks you to
press a button, a piano demands an intense bodily engagement of the player.
An important dimension of this “engaging capacity” of artifacts is the skill
that is needed to interact with them. Skill can be seen as the effort needed to
“appropriate”artifacts.What sets a piano apart from a  player is the degree
of skill that is required to use it. To use a  player, one only has to know how
to turn it on and off. Once the  is playing, no skill is required to listen to the
music. This degree of engagement does not require skill. The most important
aspect of engagement with artifacts – which is also central in acquiring skill –
is the necessity to interact with its machinery.The engagement a piano evokes
is not comparable to the interaction with, for instance, a hammer. A hammer
does not require active engagement with its machinery.For someone who has
learned to use and “incorporate” a hammer, it becomes an extension of the
body. A piano, by contrast, never becomes an extension of the body, even for
the best piano players. It requires active and concentrated interaction with its
keys and pedals, and therefore it never withdraws from a player’s intentional-
ity relationship with his or her world.
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The possibility of an “engaging presence of things” can be of importance
for Eternally Yours. Artifacts can invite relations with themselves, making
possible engaging practices in which they partly withdraw from people’s at-
tention, but yet still involve users in their functioning. In such cases, artifacts
mediate people’s relationship not only with their world, but also with the ar-
tifacts themselves. This type of mediation can provoke attachment to the ma-
teriality of things – the kind of attachment that would be helpful for Eternally
Yours.
Such engaged ways of interacting with objects also play an important role
in Gomart and Hennion’s aforementioned research on “attachment”. A post-
phenomenological perspective could enrich the vocabulary for analyses like
theirs, since it offers concepts for understanding the way artifacts are present
in events of attachment. Artifacts are the “locus” of such events, as Gomart
and Hennion say, but this locus is by no means static and passive.Attachment
comes about when artifacts invite engagement with themselves, and at the
same time create scope for people to experience and interact with the world
around them. They are somewhere in between “presence-at-hand”, by asking
for engagement, and “readiness-to-hand”, by allowing humans to do some-
thing with them instead of only interacting with the artifacts themselves.
However, looking at products in terms of their “engaging capacity” is far
from obvious. Most technological products avoid provoking engagement.
This is quite understandable, since people usually do not use technologies in
order to be engaged, but to be disburdened.As the philosopher of technology
Albert Borgmann shows, technologies tend to put their machinery in the
background in order to allow people to enjoy the commodities they procure
as quickly, easily, safely and ubiquitously as possible (Borgmann , ).
Technologies do things for us, instead of asking things from us. We prefer a
water tap to a well, because a tap does not require us to take a walk, lower a
bucket, haul it up again, and walk back home. A tap only asks for a simple,
hardly noticeable action in order to obtain water. This is the typical pattern of
technology – it creates the availability of commodities by diminishing the
need for involvement in their materialisation.
From this perspective, the challenge for culturally sustainable design is to
break this consumptive pattern in a playful way. In order to evoke attach-
ment, things should ask for engagement instead of the mere consumption of
their commodities. An attractive example of such engaging products is the
award-winning “electric/ceramic heater”, designed by Sven Adolph at Cran-
brook Academy of the Arts (Chicago). It consists of a heating element sur-
rounded by several concentric, cylindrically shaped ceramic shells of various
heights, each with a vertical aperture. The shells can be arranged in several
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ways, so that they radiate their warmth in different directions. This artifact is
not a purely functional heater that withdraws into pure functionality, like
common radiators, which are usually hidden under the windowsill and only
ask to be turned on and off. Adolph’s shell heater is an engaging product that
asks for attention and involvement in its functioning. It is intended to be
placed in the middle of the room as if it were a campfire.You cannot escape it
if you need warmth, because you have to sit around it. Its shells have to be
arranged in a certain way if we want it to function. Simply turning the heater
on and off is not enough; you actually have to get involved in its functioning if
you want it to work.
Another interesting example of engaging products is Donald Carr’s “Itha-
ca Color Printer”, also designed at Cranbrook Academy. It is a colours inkjet
printer with entirely transparent machinery. It possesses four reservoirs, for
black, yellow, red, and blue ink, and the printer head remains visible when it is
functioning. The open architecture of this printer not only makes it fascinat-
ing to watch the printing process – which would not be enough to evoke
durable attachment – it also makes the functioning of the printer under-
standable, and it is therefore able to involve humans in its functioning. It can
be refilled with ink when needed, and if mechanical problems occur, they can
easily be fixed.
When handling Adolph’s heater and Carr’s printer, users are confronted
with the materiality of these products. They are not present simply as
providers of warmth or printed text. Users are playfully forced to participate
in the processes that make these commodities available and in which the ma-
chinery of products plays a central role. Engaging products do not make
themselves invisible. They maintain present in people’s attention during use ,
without being present in the foreground of our experience.
Conclusion
The ambition of the Dutch industrial-designer association Eternally Yours to
find ways of designing “culturally sustainable”products shows several oppor-
tunities for expanding Latour’s theory of technical mediation. First, Eternally
Yours makes visible the need to expand the concept of delegation, so that it
covers delegations from nonhumans to humans as well. These nonhuman
delegations could play an important role in the attachment between humans
and things. For this attachment to come about, products could delegate the
responsibility for parts of their functioning from their machinery to their
users. In this way, users are engaged with the materiality of products, not only
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with their functionality or meaningfulness – which are the predominant foci
in current industrial design.
Second, it became clear that the concept of “script” should be expanded to
“technological intentionality”, in order to be able to localise the “mediating
capacity” not in the artifacts themselves, but in the relationship between hu-
mans and their environment that is enabled and mediated by these artifacts.
“Scripts” or “technological intentionalities” should not be seen as properties
of artifacts, but as features of configurations of humans and things, in which
some actions are stimulated and others prohibited.
Third, it has become clear that “mediation” concerns not only action but
experience as well.
The contours of a postphenomenological perspective on technical media-
tion have been sketched to allow for these expansions. This perspective also
enabled a closer analysis of the attachment between humans and artifacts
that Eternally Yours is trying to stimulate. For attachment to come about, ar-
tifacts should be present in an engaging way. They should stimulate users to
participate in their functioning, thus forging a bond between users and the
machinery of artifacts. Engaging artifacts are not present simply as genera-
tors of commodities. Their materiality cannot be avoided because humans
have to enter into a relationship with the product itself, not only with what it
does for them. And only if the product itself matters – instead of its “mean-
ing”, “image”, or “functionality” – will it be less likely to be readily discarded.
Its meaning, image, and functionality can also be procured by similar prod-
ucts.
Understanding the attachment between humans and artifacts requires an
attachment of actor-network theory to phenomenology.
Notes
 I mention his work here, even though Latour recently renounced the name “ac-
tor-network theory”because of the misleading associations that have become
connected with the concepts of “actor”,“network”,“theory”, and even the hyphen
between “actor”and “theory”(Latour b).
 More information about Eternally Yours can be found at: http://www.ecomar-
ket.net/EternallyYours.
 Ihde uses this term for his “praxis-perception model”of phenomenology, in
which phenomenology primarily concerns the perceptual aspects of human-
world relations (Ihde , , ; Ihde , ). In his introduction to postphe-
nomenology, he indicates that his phenomenological model can be ranged
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among the “posts”that have developed in philosophy, because of its pluralism and
nonfoundationalism (, ). He does not elaborate on the implications of this
turn for the methods and characteristics of the phenomenological approach it-
self, however. That is why I try to do so here, by setting out the keynotes of what I
think postphenomenology should consist of.
 “Tout l’univers de la science est construit sur le monde vécu.” (Merleau-Ponty ,
III) 
 “Il s’agit de décrire, et non pas d’expliquer ni d’analyser.” (Merleau-Ponty , IV)
 In this context,“world”indicates “disclosed reality”: or a reality as it is present to
humans in concrete situations, not “reality in itself”.
 This postphenomenological idea of the mutual constitution of subject and object
escapes Latour’s criticism on phenomenology in We Have Never Been Modern.
Latour maintains that, by connecting them to each other over the bridge of inten-
tionality, phenomenology confirms the “poles”of subject and object instead of
refuting them. Postphenomenology, however, sees the two poles as the product of
the intentional relation between them, not as pre-existing subjects and objects.
Subjectivity and objectivity arise from their interrelatedness, instead of being pre-
supposed by it.
 See Latour (b, ) for an extended use of this kind of annotation.
 See also Verbeek ().
 See Heidegger (, paragraph  and ).
 See also Verbeek and Kockelkoren ().
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